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Introduction
The Polluter Pays Principle has come to mean all things to all people, and,
in this, it has been rendered somewhat meaningless. In the trade and
environment debate, the Polluter Pays Principle has become the slogan of
environmentalists, as much as the Free Trade Principle has been the slo-
gan of the trade liberalizers. These slogans are fine as general principles,
but they have no content outside specific real world situations. Most peo-
ple advocate free trade as an objective, while recognizing that world trade
is far from free and is in fact restricted by government intervention (e.g.,
tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and subsidies). Most people advocate that pol-
luters should pay for their pollution, while recognizing that most polluters
do not pay unless forced to by government intervention (e.g., regulations
or taxes).
The implementation of both the Polluter Pays Principle and the Free
Trade Principle depend on government policies. In the trade and envi-
ronment context, these are national government policies which must be
agreed upon at the international level. Both principles will only take on
meaning for the trade and environment debate through the collective
agreement of governments regarding the interpretation of the principles
in the context of specific problems. The rules and decisions of the Gen-
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eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade' (GATT) define "Free Trade"
through a continuous process of negotiation and dispute settlement. The
Free Trade Principle only takes on meaning when governments agree on
the specific government intervention they will allow or prohibit in the
trading system. The goal is to continue reducing government
intervention.2
The Polluter Pays Principle remains a much more abstract principle
than the Free Trade Principle. The Polluter Pays Principle has not
benefitted, as has the Free Trade Principle, from forty or more years of
negotiation on what it means. More attention has been paid to defining
this principle in the last few years of trade and environment discussions
than in the twenty years since its adoption by the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development3 (OECD). The Polluter Pays Prin-
ciple has a very specific definition in the OECD context, including
directions for its implementation. The OECD interpretation of the Pol-
luter Pays Principle was agreed upon after long negotiation by the twenty-
four OECD Member countries. In the OECD context, the Polluter Pays
Principle is a cost allocation or non-subsidization principle intended to
guide governments in addressing domestic pollution.
Some groups are now trying to extend the interpretation of the Pol-
luter Pays Principle, often generating conflicting ideas on how it should be
applied to trade and environment issues. Both environmentalists and
trade liberalizers interpret the Polluter Pays Principle as a principle of cost
internalization rather than cost allocation. As applied by environmental-
ists, the principle means that polluters (and countries) who do not pay for
the costs of their domestic pollution (i.e., those who do not internalize
these costs) should be liable for trade penalties. As applied by trade liber-
alizers, the principle means that polluters (and countries) should pay for
the costs of domestic pollution as dictated by national environmental regu-
lations and not by the trading system.
Broad and idealized interpretations of the Polluter Pays Principle will
relegate it to the same status as other general slogans. To truly advance its
value to the trade and environment debate, both environmentalists and
trade liberalizers must discuss the Polluter Pays Principle as it might apply
to the thorny issues now confronting governments. The most difficult of
these issues is the internalization and allocation of the costs of addressing
pollution and degradation in environments which are shared among
countries, namely transboundary and global environmental problems.
What is needed is an interpretation of the Polluter Pays Principle to guide
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT), opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, reprinted in GATT, BAsIc INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED
DocuMENTs, 4th Supp. 1 (1969).
2. No one seriously believes government invervention will one day reduce to zero,
thereby creating an international system of absolutely free trade. It is questionable
whether this is even desirable.
3. Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental Poli-
cies, annex, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Doc.
C(72)128 (May 26, 1972) [hereinafter Guiding Pinciples].
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cost internalization and cost allocation for protecting shared environ-
ments. This article will discuss the Polluter Pays Principle as a principle
for: 1) cost allocation for domestic environments; 2) cost internalization
for domestic environments; and 3) cost internalization for shared
environments.
I. Cost Allocation for Domestic Environments
The Polluter Pays Principle in the OECD context is a non-subsidization
principle, meaning that governments should not as a general rule give
subsidies to their industries for pollution control.4 Its intent is to guide
the cost allocation between the government and the private sector in pay-
ing for domestic pollution abatement or protecting their national environ-
ments.5 It concerns who should pay, not how much should be paid. The
text of the OECD Polluter Pays Principle reads:
Cost allocation: the Polluter-Pays Principle
The principle to be used for allocating costs of pollution prevention and
control measures to encourage rational use of scarce environmental
resources and to avoid distortions in international trade and investment is
the so-called "Polluter- Pays Principle". [sic) This principle means that the
polluter should bear the expenses of carrying out the above-mentioned
measures decided by public authorities to ensure that the environment is in
an acceptable state. In other worlds [sic], the cost of these measures should
be reflected in the cost of goods and services which cause pollution in pro-
duction and/or consumption. Such measures should not be accompanied
by subsidies that would create significant distortions in international trade
and investment.6
This principle was the centerpiece of the OECD Council Recommen-
dation on Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of Envi-
ronmental Policies adopted on May 26, 1972.7 Guidelines for implementing
the principle, which provide exceptions where governments might extend
pollution control subsidies, were specified in a follow-up recommendation
adopted by the OECD Council on November 14, 1974.8 One other OECD
Council Recommendation in 1989 asserted that the private sector should
bear the costs of accidental pollution, but it also specified when govern-
ments might assist industry in the prevention and clean-up of environmen-
tal accidents. 9
4. Id. para. 4.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. For a discussion of these principles, see ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOP-
ERATION DEVELOPMENT, THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE: DEFINITION, ANALYSIs, IMPLEMEN-
TATION (1975) and Candice Stevens, The OECD Guiding Principles Revisited, 23 ENVrL. L.
607 (1993).
8. The Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle, OECD Doc. C(74)223 (Nov. 14,
1974). See also ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE
POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE: DEMNmTrON, ANALYSIS, IMPLEMENTATION (1975).
9. The Application of the Polluter-Pays Principle to Accidential Pollution, OECD Doc.
C(89)99 (Final) (July 7, 1989). For a discussion of the 1989 Council Recommendation
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Why was a principle on environmental cost allocation needed? The
early 1970s marked the advent of strict environmental regulations in
OECD countries, and complaints about high costs and negative effects on
competitiveness began to emanate from industry. The OECD govern-
ments were pressured either to help industry cover the costs of complying
with these new regulations or to impose similar costs on imports through
tariffs. There was widespread concern that both environmental subsidies
and environmental tariffs would proliferate and cause severe trade system
problems. Thus, the 1972 OECD Guiding Principles were born, which
included an agreement not to subsidize the environmental costs of indus-
try (the Polluter Pays Principle) and not to use trade remedies to compen-
sate for these costs (the Compensating Import Levies and Export Rebates
Principle). 10 Polluting firms should bear the costs of pollution control
and should not benefit from environmental subsidies or import duties
which might distort trade.
In the OECD, the Polluter Pays Principle mirrors the Free Trade Prin-
ciple-government interventions that might affect trade should be mini-
mized." It is, in effect, an efficiency principle for allocating costs for
domestic pollution and does not involve reducing pollution. The private
sector should bear the expense of preventing and controlling pollution to
ensure that the environment is in an acceptable state. Public authorities,
through national environmental regulations, decide the notion of what
constitutes an acceptable state.1 2 In other words, the private sector should
bear the costs of measures that it is legally bound to take to protect the
environment. The type and amount of costs that are actually borne or
internalized in these environmental regulations are national government
decisions.
At the same time, governments recognized that the costs of environ-
mental regulations imposed severe burdens on certain industries and
firms which, for economic and political reasons, could not be allowed to
contract or to disappear. Adjustments were needed to fine-tune the Free
Trade Principle and the Polluter Pays Principle to fit real-life problems.
Negotiations among governments revealed that environmental subsidies
were preferable to import duties in aiding troubled industries. Limited
use of government subsidies to help underwrite environmental costs could
help mitigate demands for trade protection. In addition, government
assistance might be needed to realize domestic environmental policy
objectives within a prescribed period of time.
The 1974 OECD Council Recommendation on The Implementation of
the Polluter-Pays Principle gave this principle its most concrete interpreta-
tion. 13 The 1972 text of the Polluter Pays Principle had stated that "there
and other OECD work on applying the Polluter Pays Principle, see The Polluter-Pays
Principle: OECD Analyses and Recommendations, OECD Doc. OCDE/GD(92)81 (1992).
10. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, para. 13.
11. Id. para. 4.
12. Id.
13. The Implementation of the Polluter Pays Principle, supra note 8.
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may be exceptions or special arrangements, particularly for transitional
periods" to the non-subsidization mandate.1 4 In 1974, the OECD went
further in specifying the situations where governments could give subsi-
dies to industry to help them comply with environmental regulations.
According to the OECD, government assistance for pollution control
might be given: 1) to ease transitional periods when especially stringent
pollution control regimes begin; 2) to stimulate the development of new
pollution control technologies; and 3) in the context of measures to
achieve specific socio-economic objectives, such as the reduction of seri-
ous interregional imbalances. 15
To avoid the abuse of these government subsidies, it was further speci-
fied that any assistance granted under the OECD exceptions should be
given for a fixed amount of time in a clearly defined program and should
not create significant distortions in international trade and investment.
Specifically:
a) it should be selective and restricted to those parts of the economy, such
as industries, areas or plants, where severe difficulties would otherwise
occur,
b) it should be limited to well-defined transitional periods, laid down in
advance and adapted to the specific socio-economic problems associated
with the implementation of a country's environmental programme;
c) it should not create significant distortions in international trade and
investment. 16
This OECD interpretation of the Polluter Pays Principle was later adopted
by the European Community, which laid out even more specific directions
on the percentage of costs and length of time for environmental
subsidies.17
II. Environmental Subsidies: The Neglected Issue
Twenty years later, the issue of environmental subsidies was revisited in the
context of the Uruguay Round of the GATT. The negotiating group on
subsidies and countervailing measures debated the advantages and disad-
vantages of environmental subsidies as part of a general attempt to impose
more discipline on the use of government subsidies. Some governments
proposed that environmental subsidies be included in that category of gov-
ernment supports that are generally acceptable (or non-actionable in
trade terms) under conditions similar to the OECD interpretation of the
Polluter Pays Principle. Other governments were concerned that this
treatment would allow environmental supports to be used as disguised aids
to industry and might act as a cover to support less competitive sectors.
14. Guiding Prindpler, supra note 3.
15. The Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle, supra note 8, para. H.2-4.
16. Id. para. II1.2.
17. The Single European Act mentions the Polluter Pays Principle. Single Euro-
pean Act, art. 25, 1987 OJ. (L 169) 1, 11.
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It was finally agreed, in the last days of the Uruguay Round negotia-
tions, that environmental subsidies would be placed in the non-actionable
category along with subsidies for research activities and subsidies to disad-
vantaged regions. Under these rules, environmental subsidies are to be
used only for the adaptation of existing facilities (i.e., those having been in
operation for at least two years) to new environmental regulations.' 8 Any
environmental support is to be for one time only, limited to 20% of the
cost of adaptation, strictly for pollution control, and available to all firms
which can adopt new equipment or processes.' 9
As in the case of the OECD Polluter Pays Principle, these provisions
cover only industrial sector environmental subsidies and not those in the
agriculture and natural resource sectors. In the GATr, the Uruguay
Round Agreement on Agriculture covers agricultural sector environmen-
tal subsidies. 20 The agreement provides that environmental subsidies in
agriculture are exempt from the subsidy reduction commitment in the
remainder of the agreement.2 ' The exemption applies if such payments
are part of a clearly defined government environmental or conservation
program, and the amount of the payment is limited to the extra costs or
loss of income involved in complying with the program.22
Some governments, industries, and theorists object to the use of envi-
ronmental subsidies, preferring instead a strict interpretation of the Pol-
luter Pays Principle that disallows such supports.2 3 They believe that
environmental costs should be considered as one cost of doing business
and the ability to cover these costs as a factor in industry competitiveness.
They fear that government assistance for pollution control will give an
unfair advantage to certain firms and sectors in international trade. In
general, multilateral trade negotiations have been aimed at removing or
rolling back government subsidies, such as export credits and agricultural
supports, which are extremely difficult to phase-out once they take root.
Government subsidies have been shown to increase in time and in
breadth, making them true threats to both trade and the environment. At
present, the OECD is trying to identify and measure all types of govern-
ment subsidies to industrial sectors. This endeavor may prove to be more
18. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, GATT Doc. MTN/FA 11-13, in
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations [here-
inafter Uruguay Round], GATT Doc. MTN/FA (Dec. 15, 1993), 33 I.L.M. 9 (1994),
reprinted in OFnCE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINAL Acr EMBODYING THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY RouND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (VERSION OF
15 DECEMBER 1993) (1993).
19. See id.
20. See Agreement on Agricultur GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-AIA-3 (Dec. 15, 1993), in
Uruguay Round, supra note 18.
21. See id.
22. Id. para. 12.
23. See, e.g., Robert Morris, A Business Perspective on the Competitiveness Effects of Envi-
ronmental Policies, in ENmRONMENTAL POLICIES AND INDUSTRAL COMPETITIVENESS 168
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ed., 1993).
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complex and difficult than identifying supports to agriculture.24
Part of the problem is the lack of data on the assistance governments
are extending to industry for environmental and other purposes. Environ-
mental subsidies might be more generally accepted if it were easier to
monitor their use and to ensure that they were not violating the excep-
tions to the OECD Polluter Pays Principle. Establishing such a monitoring
system might ensure that environmental subsidies do not go beyond the
new rules set by the GATT; otherwise, they will be subject to countervailing
duties if the subsidized exports cause injury to competing industries in
other countries.
The OECD has had limited success in monitoring environmental sub-
sidies in conjunction with the implementation of the Polluter Pays Princi-
ple.25 A notification and consultation system regarding financial
assistance for pollution prevention and control was set up in the mid-
1970s. 26 Four surveys were carried out under the procedure for Notifica-
tion of Assistance Schemes in 1975, 1978-79, 1981-82 and 1987-88.27
According to these surveys, governments are not giving extensive environ-
mental subsidies (either as a percentage of overall subsidies or as a per-
centage of overall environmental costs), and the impact on international
trade is small or negligible overall. 28 It is believed, however, that these
surveys do not capture a large share of environmental subsidies, as they
are often categorized under different types of government supports, such
as assistance to regions, employment, or research. 29 In general, available
data is sketchy and incomplete.
High levels of government environmental aid to a specific firm or
sector could no doubt have trade implications. Certain polluting sectors
could receive unfair trade benefits. According to the OECD surveys, some
OECD countries give no environmental assistance at all, whereas others
give a substantial amount.3 0 It is unclear how this assistance is spread over
different firms and sectors. Most subsidies in the 1970s were for air and
water pollution control, while assistance in the 1980s shifted to focus on
the development and testing of new technologies.3 ' The surveys indicate
that government environmental subsidies peaked in the mid-1970s; no
24. Industrial Support Policies in OECD Countries, OECD Doc. OCDE/GD(92)126
(1992).
25. Fnancial Assistance Systems for Pollution Prevention and Control in OECD Countries 5-
6, OECD Environment Monographs No. 33 (June 1990).
26. I
27. Id.
28. Id. at 13.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 8-9 (Survey data concentrating on assistance given from 1973-1987 reveals
that the United States has provided the greatest assistance, with the Netherlands,
Belgium, Germany, and Japan also providing significant assistance. Although France,
Finland, and Denmark have provided considerably smaller amounts, toward the end of
the period the values greatly increased, demonstrating an increased concern with pro-
viding assistance for research and the development and testing of new technology.).
31. Id. at 9.
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data is available after 1988.32 Future OECD surveys of industrial subsidies
will attempt to capture supports given for environmental purposes.
Looking to the future, environmental subsidies might be expected to
increase in the 1990s due to several factors, including: 1) more stringent
and widespread environmental regulations in most OECD countries; 2)
continued economic and structural adjustment problems in many indus-
tries; and 3) a new emphasis on the production of environmental goods
and services as an industry in its own right.33 There are indications that
governments are increasing their assistance to industry for the develop-
ment and implementation of new environmental technologies as the envi-
ronment industry comes to be viewed as a strategic sector. OECD
estimates show that the world market for environmental goods and serv-
ices (primarily end-of-pipe rather than pollution prevention or clean tech-
nologies) is $200 billion a year and is growing at a rate of 5.5% each
year.3 4 Helping industry develop and deploy environmental technologies
is increasingly seen by OECD governments as good for the environment
and good for trade.3 5
A recent OECD study focused on government subsidies to clean tech-
nologies, which are processes aimed at pollution prevention rather than
clean-up at the end of the production line.3 6 It is estimated that govern-
ments are giving $1.5 to $2 billion annually for both the developffient and
implementation of clean technologies.3 7 Most assistance is in the form of
grants and low-interest loans which cover 20% to 50% of project costs.38
Given the prospect of increasing amounts of environmental subsidies,
more attention should be paid to ensuring their efficient use as well as
preventing their abuse for protectionist purposes. More work is needed
on interpreting the Polluter Pays Principle as a cost allocation or non-
subsidization principle for domestic pollution as well as on applying it to
the natural resource and agricultural sectors.
m. Cost Internalization for Domestic Environments
Many circles interpret the Polluter Pays Principle as a general cost inter-
nalization principle, with scarce mention of the subsidy aspect. The
emphasis is on the wording in the text of the OECD Polluter Pays Princi-
ple, which states that polluting firms should bear the costs of pollution
control and "the cost of these measures should be reflected in the cost of
goods and services which cause pollution in production and/or consump-
32. Id. at 8-9.
33. See The OECD Environment Industhy: Situation, Prospects and Government Policies 4,
OECD Doc. OCDE/GD(92) 1 (1992).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Supply Side Policies to Augment Government SupportforPromoting Cleaner Technologies,
OECD Doc. OCDE/GD/(94)31 (1994).
37. I&
38. Id.
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tion."3 9 Under this view, the Polluter Pays Principle means that govern-
ments should ensure that environmental costs are assumed by and passed
on to consumers through product prices. The focus is on how much
should be paid, not on who should pay. Trade liberalizers emphasize the
importance of internalizing environmental costs through domestic envi-
ronmental policies so that prices of traded products can reflect these costs.
Environmentalists take this one step further in advocating that the trading
system itself should encourage governments to ensure that environmental
costs are internalized. In the view of environmentalists, the competitive
conditions of the international trading system prevent full cost internaliza-
tion because of the fear of lost market share.
In some respects, the current debate about the Polluter Pays Principle
as a cost internalization principle is not that different from the original
discussions in 1972. The emphasis has switched, however, to the advan-
tages and disadvantages of using compensating import levies (or counter-
vailing duties) to help industry remain competitive while simultaneously
dealing with domestic pollution. In 1972, discussions were about the
advantages and disadvantages of using environmental subsidies for the
same reason. In the intervening twenty years, the debate shifted from the
Polluter Pays Principle as a guide to allocating costs for domestic pollution
between the government and the private sector, to the Polluter Pays Prin-
ciple as a guide to internalizing costs for domestic pollution by countries
engaged in international trade. The tool in the first instance is govern-
ment subsidies while the tools in the second case are countervailing duties
and other trade actions.
OECD governments considered and decided against these second
tools in the OECD Principle on Compensating Import Levies and Export
Rebates. 40 The text of this principle reads as follows:
In accordance with the provisions of the GAIT, differences in environmen-
tal policies should not lead to the introduction of compensating import
levies or export rebates, or measures having an equivalent effect, designed
to offset the consequences of these differences on prices. Effective imple-
mentation of the guiding principles set forth herewith will make it unneces-
sary and undesirable to resort to such measures.
Despite proposals from different quarters, there has been no indica-
tion that governments have any intention of modifying the prohibition on
the use of countervailing duties to force foreign polluters to pay the costs
of their pollution. Although such proposals have been made since at least
the early 1970s, environmental countervailing duties have never been seri-
ously considered by OECD governments and have never been used.
Hence the governmental view on the use of countervailing duties is far
different from the governmental view on the use of environmental subsi-
dies. Yet both tools are aimed at the same goal: to reduce the negative
39. Guiding Principler, supra note 3, para. 4.
40. Id. para. 13.
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competitive impacts of the high cost of environmental regulations on
domestic industries.
It is doubtful that governments will agree to a principle that, as a gen-
eral rule, legitimizes countervailing duties on imports that do not simulta-
neously internalize their environmental costs. In other words, these
imports are alleged to be subsidized by their governments through a lack
of environmental regulations. The theoretical, practical, and moral
problems with this proposal have been explained and reiterated many
times over. In sum, countries should be allowed to have different environ-
mental regulations to deal with domestic pollution depending on their
ecological conditions, their preferences, and their priorities. Giving other
countries free reign to determine what constitutes appropriate environ-
mental regulations in exporting countries does not make sense.
More likely, governments will continue to interpret the OECD Princi-
ple on Compensating Import Levies and Export Rebates4' as a non-coun-
tervailing duty principle for domestic pollution. Promoting cost
internalization in cases of domestic pollution will continue to be the job of
national environmental regulations and not of international trade rules.
It is conceivable, however, that some type of accord on domestic environ-
mental standards might accompany trade liberalization agreements.
There are indications that governments will trade absolute sovereignty
over their internal environmental regulations in exchange for trade bene-
fits. For example, accompanying the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment 42 (NAFrA) is an environmental agreement, largely to prevent
industry migration, aimed at ensuring the enforcement of the three par-
ties' existing environmental laws.4 3 A NAFTA-type side agreement, or a
code of minimum environmental standards for domestic pollution, could
accompany future GAT' agreements, but experience suggests it would
take far longer to devise such a code than to conclude most GATT rounds.
Such a code is probably better formulated by an environmental organiza-
tion which is then given the power to monitor and to enforce it.
IV. Cost Internalization for Shared Environments
The debate for and against countervailing duties tends to detract attention
from trade tools which may be needed to protect the world's environment.
Discussions on how to interpret the Polluter Pays Principle as a cost inter-
nalization principle for domestic pollution do not help devise solutions to
real trade and environment dilemmas. The actual issue is who should pay
for the costs of preventing and cleaning up environmental degradation in
those environments that are shared among countries. The solutions to
global problems such as climate change, ozone layer depletion, loss of
41. Id.
42. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 296 and 32 I.L.M. 605 thereinafter NAFTA].
43. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32
IL.M. 1480.
Vol. 27
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biodiversity, and endangered species, as well as transboundary problems
such as acid rain, river pollution, and management of migratory species,
may partly depend on the trading system. Free trade may have to be lim-
ited as a means of encouraging or coercing governments to pay for the
costs of protecting shared environments. This is probably more a case of
interpreting the Free Trade Principle than the Polluter Pays Principle, as
it consists of agreeing on when government intervention into free trade is
needed to internalize costs for shared environmental degradation.
The cost internalization rules for permissible trade actions for shared
environments have to be agreed upon internationally. Countries must
first agree that there is a shared environmental problem and that this
problem might be severe enough to warrant trade actions before any inter-
vention into free trade for environmental purposes joins an international
environmental agreement. The problem with international environmen-
tal agreements is that they are difficult to negotiate. Furthermore, it is
usually impossible to secure full participation by the countries concerned.
Unlike trade agreements which are about allocating profits among coun-
tries and industries, environmental agreements are about spending those
profits. Few governments, industries, or people will voluntarily spend
their profits to clean up the environment. Environmental problems stem
from market failures and, at both the national and international levels,
they require government intervention to correct.
The other problem with international environmental agreements is
that they are difficult to enforce. Most of the major international environ-
mental agreements-such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer,44 the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,45 and the Basel Convention
on Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Dispo-
sa146-do not contain either enforcement mechanisms or dispute settle-
ment mechanisms. The parties may violate these agreements when they
can do so without being discovered. More seriously, non-parties can easily
violate and even undermine these agreements. Thus, without specific
trade controls, free-riders can produce and trade ozone-depleting sub-
stances, exploit and trade endangered species, and generate and trade
hazardous wastes. These violations can cancel out the environmental
actions and costs being borne by the parties abiding by the agreements.
When countries agree on steps to address a shared environmental
problem, they should have available all the tools needed to mount, imple-
ment, and enforce the agreement. Because shared environmental
problems often stem from international market failures, negotiating coun-
tries may need to utilize trade tools. Because government trade interven-
44. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,
26 I.L.M. 1541, 1550.
45. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1085, 1088.
46. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, UNEP/IG.80/3, 28 I.L.M. 649, 657.
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tion can easily be protectionist and can also seriously disadvantage the
weaker and poorer members of the trading system, there needs to be crite-
ria to guide the use of trade measures relating to international environ-
mental agreements.
First, there must be a definition of what constitutes an international
environmental agreement, i.e.,just how many countries must agree on the
shared environmental problem. One proposed definition is an agreement
which includes the countries accounting for a substantial proportion of
the activity concerned. Another definition is based on the number of
countries needed to address effectively the environmental problem. Thus,
if countries responsible for a large share of the production and consump-
tion of ozone-depleting substances agree to phase out these substances,
any one of them might use trade restrictions to implement and/or
enforce the agreement. The same understanding would apply to coun-
tries representing a large share of tuna fished in specific regions using
purse-seine nets which kill dolphins, or countries representing a substan-
tial proportion of those taking a threatened species in a high-seas fishery.
If most of the major actors can agree on a problem and a solution, they
should not be prevented from protecting shared environments because of
the lack of effective tools to prevent free-riders from undermining their
actions.
Second, the rules must not ignore that trade interventions are not to
be taken lightly and should ensure that alternative options for achieving
the environmental objective are explored. There are often good reasons
why countries do not participate in international environmental agree-
ments. They may not agree on the severity of the shared environmental
problem, which is not unusual given the limitations on scientific proof.
They may not agree that the environmental problem is shared; they may
believe it is their own domestic problem (e.g., tropical timber) or it is a
problem they have not contributed to at all (e.g., climate change). They
may not agree on the recommended solutions to the problem, or they may
believe the steps to be taken and costs to be internalized are not equitably
shared among countries. From their perspective, the environmental prob-
lem may not be a priority for government action, or they may simply not
have the money or the technical capacity to address the problem.
This is why effective international environmental agreements are hard
to come by. But the use of trade tools should not be at the cost of overrid-
ing the legimitate concerns and limitations of different countries. Thus,
trade restrictions should be a last resort option for international environ-
mental agreements. They should only be used after negotiation, diplo-
macy, and offers of technical and financial assistance to the hold-out
countries have failed.
Third, whether trade tools are used or not, many countries are too
poor to comply with international environmental agreements. They will
be made poorer by restrictions on their imports and exports. The use of
trade restrictions relating to international environmental agreements
should be accompanied by technical and financial assistance for develop-
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ing countries. The OECD countries can generally afford to internalize the
costs of protecting shared environments, but many non-OECD countries
often cannot.
These types of criteria still will not cover all situations, and in any
case, objections and disputes are likely to arise. Jagdish Bhagwati, a for-
mer adviser to the GATT, has suggested criteria that could be employed to
assess the legitimacy of trade restrictions that address situations of environ-
mental spillover.47 These criteria are, in essence:
1) Intent-the intent of the trade measure is environmental rather than
protectionist.
2) Alternative Measures-effective alternatives to the trade measure have
been explored and rejected.
3) Science-there is some hard scientific evidence as to the existence of the
environmental problem, although the precautionary principle can be
invoked.
4) Equity-the solution to the environmental problem is equitable among
the countries concerned.
The United States Council on International Business has also proposed a
list of criteria governing the use of trade measures relative to international
environmental agreements based largely on notions of multilateralism and
intent.48 Theorists, industrialists, and politicians are now starting to
debate criteria for trade restrictions for shared environments, which is a
sign that a new principle may be born.
Conclusion
This paper suggests a framework for a new principle aimed at internalizing
costs in order to protect shared environments. The best approach would
be to adopt a new principle rather than build upon existing principles.
The Polluter Pays Principle as a cost allocation principle for domestic envi-
ronments still requires interpretation with respect to the use of environ-
mental subsidies in different economic sectors. The Principle on
Compensating Import Levies and Export Rebates 49 effectively deals with
cost internalization for domestic environments by prohibiting counter-
vailing duties. The trade and environment debate must focus on both cost
internalization for shared environments and the role of the trading system
in creating and correcting environmental problems that spill over national
borders. A considerable amount of time and negotiation will be needed
to decide on such a principle and to agree on its implementation in spe-
cific situations. Its interpretation will evolve over time as disputes arise
and are resolved through dispute settlement mechanisms. This new prin-
47. Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade and the Environment: The False Conflict?, in TRADE AND
THE ENvIRONMENr. LAW, EcoNoMIcs tAN PouICY 159, 178-83 (Durwood Zaelke et al.
eds., 1993).
48. UNrrED STATES COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL BusiNEss, STATEMENT ON INTERNA-
TIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEmENrS AND THE USE OF TRADE MFAsuREs TO ACHIEVE
THEIR OBJEcnVES 4-7 (1993).
49. Guiding Principes, supra note 3, para. 13.
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ciple should be part of both international trade law and international envi-
ronmental law as an example of the true integration of the two policy
areas.
